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Production often causes pollution as a by-product. Once environmental degra-
dation becomes too severe, regulation is introduced by which society forces the
economy to make a transition to cleaner production processes. We model this
transition as a change in \general purpose technology" and investigate how it
interferes with economic growth driven by quality-improvements. The model
gives an explanation for the inverted U-shaped pollution-income relation found
in empirical research for many pollutants (Environmental Kuznets Curve). We
provide an analytical foundation for the claim that the rise and decline of pol-
lution can be explained by policy-induced technology shifts and intrasectoral
changes.
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An old, classical and recurring theme in economics is the relationship be-
tween economic growth and concern for environmental problems. It ranges
from the physiocrats' focus on land, Jevons's coal question and the Club of
Rome's doomsday scenarios, to the current greenhouse gas problem. The En-
vironmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) is one of the most-used concepts to analyse
the pollution-income relation and has recently attracted considerable attention.
Empirical EKC studies ¯nd evidence for an inverted U-shaped pollution-income
relation for many pollutants, in particular for short-lived air and water pollu-
tants that have local and immediate e®ects.1 The theoretical EKC literature
explains the hump-shaped pollution-income relation from, among others, scale
economies, income-induced policy changes and exogenous shifts in the nature
of growth.
In the paper at hand, we study the relationship between endogenous eco-
nomic growth and pollution in a model in which pollution problems ¯rst grad-
ually build up with the introduction of new technologies, new materials and
new energy sources. Environmental degradation attracts the public's attention
and triggers a regulatory response in the form of a pollution tax. Finally, ¯rms
adopt cleaner technologies to minimise costs. We use the model, ¯rst, to give
an integrated explanation for the EKC, second, to analyse how technological
change may drive pollution reductions when the economy grows and, third,
to show how intrasectoral { rather than intersectoral { shifts accompany the
adoption of pollution-reducing technologies.
We di®er from the existing theoretical literature on the EKC since we treat
changes in technology as endogenous. In particular, innovation opportunities
and incentives not only determine the growth rate of income, but also whether
technological change is pollution-using or pollution-saving. Usually, the theo-
retical EKC literature assumes either exogenous income (Lieb 2002, Andreoni
and Levinson 2001), exogenously given factor endowments that determine in-
come (Copeland and Taylor 2003, chapter 3) or exogenous technological change
(Brock and Taylor 2004). Previous results, however, have pointed out that the
source of growth and the nature of technology determines whether economic
growth and pollution are linked or delinked. What is missing in the theoretical
EKC literature is an explanation of why and how the sources of growth change
and how they are related to pollution problems. To make both income and
technology endogenous, we use a Schumpeterian endogenous growth model.
Other endogenous growth models have studied the link between income and
pollution, but have neglected temporal shifts in the direction of technological
change as resulting from pro¯t incentives.2 For example, Stokey (1998) gen-
erates the EKC in a model with exogenous technology. Aghion and Howitt
1For example sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides or suspended particulate matter. For a
survey of the empirical evidence see e.g. the special issues of Environment and Development
Economics 1997 and Ecological Economics 1998, or the recent review articles by Stern (2004)
and Lieb (2003).
2See Smulders (1995, 2000) for surveys on environmental growth models and Bretschger
(1999) for the integration of natural resource use into modern growth theory.
1(1998) have extended her model by introducing endogenous technology, but
focus on balanced growth only and do not distinguish between pollution-using
and pollution-saving technological change. Finally, de Groot (1999) models an
EKC with technological change as a learning-by-doing process.
Besides the shifts towards cleaner production technologies a second mecha-
nism is often stressed in explaining the decoupling of environmental degradation
from economic growth: changes in the composition of production.3 Shifts be-
tween agriculture, manufacturing and services as well as intersectoral shifts
within manufacturing have been relatively small in recent decades in devel-
oped countries, see Torvanger (1991) and de Bruyn (1997). An exception is
the US, where dramatic shifts towards cleaner industries have been observed at
the end of the last century (Ederington et al., 2004). Hence, such composition
e®ects can account for at most a small part of the EKC. But, there is strong
evidence for the importance of intrasectoral change. For example, JÄ anicke et
al. (1997) report that in 1989 the industrial ¯nal energy consumption of Ger-
many was 30.4% lower than it would have been without intrasectoral change
since 1970. The corresponding ¯gures for Japan and Sweden are 58.6% and
27.6%.4 Moreover, in empirical decomposition analyses, intrasectoral changes
are mostly subsumed under the label \technique e®ect", which usually accounts
for the major part of emission reductions. This e®ect, however, contains more
than purely technological changes. It also incorporates changes in the spectrum
of goods produced in a sector, i.e. intrasectoral shifts, as well as substitution
of inputs and the application of end-of-pipe technologies, see de Bruyn (2000).
While the literature has often used a decomposition of changes in pollution
in terms of a scale, technology and composition e®ect, this decomposition has
been purely descriptive, or as a decomposition of the e®ects of a shock (notably
trade liberalisation shocks, see Copeland and Taylor 2004). What is missing
is an explanation of how and why the interaction of the composition, scale
and technology e®ects can generate the EKC pattern. Our contribution to the
theoretical literature on the EKC is an attempt to provide elements of these
missing links. In particular, ¯rst we model how incentives arise to invest in
pollution-intensive technologies before incentives become in favour of pollution-
saving technologies, and, second, we sort out how over the technology lifecycle
the balance between (intrasectoral) composition and technique e®ects changes
so that the EKC arises. To do so, we carefully analyse ¯rm behaviour under
the di®erent technology conditions.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides an
informal overview of the model and presents the general mechanisms producing
EKCs. In Section 3, the formal model is introduced. The development of
innovation and pollution in four di®erent phases are analysed in Section 4.
In Section 5, it is examined to what extend the model accounts for empirical
observations. Finally, Section 6 summarises and concludes.
3See Copeland and Taylor (1994) for the distinction between scale, composition and tech-
nique e®ects.
4By contrast, intersectoral change reduced energy consumption by only 13% in Germany
and Japan and by 2.1% in Sweden.
22 An Informal Overview of the Model
This section gives an informal overview of the model. In particular, we describe
how technology changes, how ¯rms determine investments in new technologies
and how pollution evolves over time.
Technology changes along two dimensions. First, ¯rms improve the quality
of their products incrementally. Second, pollution-saving an pollution-using
inventions arise in clusters at discrete times. They can be interpreted as general
purpose technologies (GPT), de¯ned by Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995) as
technologies that have a potential to a®ect a large part of the economy. For
example, we can think of energy systems: the use of horsepower, fossil fuels or
nuclear power as source of energy constitute milestones in energy production.
Such technology changes had and have a large impact on pollution, e.g. in the
context of the regional pollution of air and water.5
Both types of innovation, i.e. quality improvements and the adoption of a
new GPT, are costly and require R&D expenditures. Firms choose the type of
innovation that yields highest pro¯ts. Since it is costly to adopt new technolo-
gies, di®usion is slow and producers using old technologies may coexist with
producers using new ones. Thus, ¯rms are heterogeneous in terms of pollution
output ratios, prices and output levels. Changes in pollution result not only
from changes in the scale of activity and the technique used within ¯rms, but
also from the process of creative destruction in which producers of one type are
gradually replaced by producers of another type.
As our model has to include several technologies, di®erent types of producers
and di®erent types of product qualities, the framework runs the risk of becoming
very complex. To reduce complexity, we make two simplifying assumptions.
First, we set up the model such that only one type of innovation is being
undertaken at a certain moment in time, either quality improvements or new
GPT adoption. Second, at most two types of ¯rms are active at any point in
time. That is, after the occurrence of an new GPT no quality improvements
are undertaken until all sectors have adopted the new GPT.
In the model, we distinguish four phases, of which the main characteristics
are summarised in Figure 1. In the ¯rst phase, the so-called \green phase", only
one GPT is available, which causes no pollution. In the second phase, a new
GPT becomes available and is gradually adopted; this de¯nes the \adoption
subphase". Firms invest in the adoption of the new GPT since it saves on their
labour costs. Once all sectors in the economy have adopted the new GPT, ¯rms
again invest in product quality improvements; this de¯nes the \improvement
subphase". Yet, to operate the new GPT, pollution cannot be avoided. As
a result, pollution rises, ¯rst, with adoption and, subsequently, with rising
output. The latter is due to the fact that ¯rms, which have improved their
product quality, charge a lower price and produce more than their predecessors.
However, pollution is not yet recognised as a problem. Accordingly, we call the
5GPTs have been studied in endogenous growth literature in the context of Romer's variety
expanding model (Helpman and Trajtenberg 1998) or models of growth based on inhouse R&D
(Nahuis 2003). We contribute to this literature by modelling GPTs in the quality ladder



























































Figure 1: Overview of the model
second phase the \con¯dence phase". The third phase starts once it becomes
clear that the new technology is harmful and once public concern has become
widespread. Correspondingly, the third phase is labelled \alarm phase". The
government responds to the public's concern by taxing emissions. As a result,
¯rms cut back production and pollution decreases. As soon as a new, clean GPT
becomes available, a new phase of adoption starts. We assume that this third
GPT allows ¯rms to reduce costs since it saves on pollution tax expenditures.
With its invention, the \cleaning-up phase" starts. The clean GPT is gradually
introduced in the di®erent sectors of the economy and pollution decreases in
the course of time (during the adoption subphase). Ultimately, all ¯rms have
adopted the new, clean GPT and, therefore, pollution is absent and ¯rms again
invest to improve their product quality (improvement subphase).
Over time, technological change not only a®ects the level of pollution, but
also market structure. Firms that improve quality drive producers with lower
quality levels out of the market. Similarly, ¯rms that adopt a new GPT drive
producers exploiting the old technology out of the market. The bottom part of
Figure 1 indicates the di®erent types of ¯rms that are active in each phase. In
the green phase, all incumbent ¯rms use and improve the ¯rst GPT; we refer to
\traditional quality leaders". The next GPT entails lower labour costs. Hence,
¯rms that have adopted this GPT are called \labour-cost leaders" and gradually
replace traditional ¯rms. As soon as all traditional ¯rms are replaced by labour-
cost leaders, researchers start inventing blueprints to upgrade goods qualities.
Firms buying these blueprints replace in turn the initial cost leaders. As there
is no environmental regulation, we call this ¯rms \unregulated quality leaders".
In the alarm phase, unregulated quality leaders suddenly become \regulated
quality leaders" as they are now taxed for their emissions. Once a new clean
GPT has arrived, ¯rms that have adopted this GPT enter the market and
4replace regulated quality leaders. We call these ¯rms \¯rst movers". Once all
sectors have switched to the clean technology, sectors start investing in quality
upgrading. As a consequence, \ecological quality leaders" gradually penetrate
the market.
3 The Model
There is a continuum of sectors, indexed i, each producing a good that enters
the households' utility function as an imperfect substitute. Each good can be
produced in a number of varieties. Varieties di®er in two dimensions. First,
di®erent qualities, indexed m, of the same good can be produced. A new gener-
ation of the product is of higher quality. Second, the labour input requirements
and pollution output ratios for a given quality level may di®er according to the
general technology, indexed j, used.
Pollution hurts households' utility. Whether a new technology causes pol-
lution or not is unknown at the time of its introduction. Only when exposure
to the pollutant has been long enough, damages, if any, can be established and
an emission tax is implemented. This increase in production costs makes it
attractive to switch to new production processes with lower pollution output
ratios.
Households




[ln(Ct) ¡ Ht]e¡½tdt (1)
where ½ is the utility discount rate, C is the index of consumption, H is harm
from emissions, which consumers take as given, and t is a time index. Con-
sumers have Cobb Douglas preferences over a continuum of goods indexed i on
the unit interval. Di®erentiated products of a given good i substitute perfectly











where qim is the quality of the mth product generation in industry i and ximt
is the associated production at time t. Maximisation of utility subject to the
usual budget constraints implies that only the good with the lowest price per
unit of quality is consumed in each industry i. We denote this good by ~ mi.
Static utility maximisation implies:
ximt = Yt=pimt for m = ~ mi
ximt = 0 otherwise
(3)
6Households are modelled exactly as in Grossman and Helpman (1991), but for the inclusion





m pimtximt)di denotes total consumption expenditure and
pimt is the price of good i of quality m at time t.
Utility maximisation also implies that consumption expenditure Y grows
at a rate equal to the di®erence between the (nominal) interest rate r and the
utility discount rate:
_ Y =Y = r ¡ ½: (4)
Production
Each producer holds a unique blueprint (patent) for production such that the
market form is monopolistic competition. The blueprint allows the holder to
produce good i at quality m, using technology j.
Unit production costs vary with technology but not with sector or quality.
Production of one unit of output x requires aLj units of labour and emits aZj
units of pollution if technology j is used. Unit costs c for technology j at time
t are thus given by:
cjt = aLjwt + aZj¿t (5)
where w and ¿ denote the wage and pollution tax respectively. Output in each
sector is given by:
xi = Y=pi; (6)
that is spending per sector, Y (which equals aggregate spending because the
total mass of sectors is normalised to one), divided by the price set by the
incumbent in the sector, pi.
Within a sector, ¯rms engage in Bertrand competition. The leading ¯rm
sets the limit price that equals the cost level of its closest rival corrected for
quality di®erences. It is useful to distinguish between two (broad) types of
¯rms: cost leaders and quality leaders. Cost leaders are the ¯rst producers in
the sector that have introduced a new general purpose technology. They have
a cost advantage over their closest rival (but produce the same quality level).
Cost leaders using technology j set a price equal to their rival's cost level cj¡1.
Quality leaders are the producers that supply the highest quality level in the
sector. They have a cost advantage over their closest rival in terms of costs
corrected for the quality lead (but use the same technology). A quality leader
using technology j sets the limit price ¸cj, where ¸ > 1 represents the quality
di®erence. Since new blueprints for higher quality levels become available as
a result of the innovation process (with the newest quality level being ¸ times
the previous quality level developed), quality leaders are always ¸ ahead. This
implies that we may write for the price set in sector i:
pi = ¸cj if in i a quality leader is active that employs technology j,
pi = cj¡1 if in i a cost leader is active that employs technology j.
(7)















Y if in i a cost leader is active that employs
technology j.
Let us now be more speci¯c and distinguish between the three GPTs and six
types of producers already described above. The three GPTs appearing in the
model are indexed j = 1;2;3 for the \traditional", \labour-saving" and \clean"
technology respectively. GPT 1 requires one unit of labour per unit of output
and emissions are zero. GPT 2 requires ´ < 1 units of labour, but emits one unit
of the pollutant per unit of output. GPT 3 is again a zero-emissions technology
and requires ° units of labour per unit of output. We assume that GPT 3
improves upon GPT 1, i.e. ° < 1. Hence we may write:
aL1 = 1;aL2 = ´ < 1;aL3 = ° < 1;aZ1 = aZ3 = 0;aZ2 = 1: (9)
In the green phase and in the con¯dence phase, there is no tax on pollution,
that is ¿ = 0, but from the alarm phase onward, emissions are taxed. The tax
is assumed to be constant in terms of the wage, and we then have ¿=w > 0.
The six types of producers described in Section 2 and the bottom part
of Figure 1 are index by k 2 fT;L;U;R;F;Eg, where T denotes \traditional
quality leaders", L \labour cost leaders", U \unregulated quality leaders", R
\regulated quality leaders", F \¯rst movers" and E \ecological quality leaders".
Using equations (7) and (8) it is now straightforward to determine prices
and pro¯ts of each type of producer. Table 1 gives the results for producers of
type k.
Table 1: Prices and pro¯ts for the six types of producers
k T L U R F E
















































where nk is the number of sectors with ¯rms of type k.
Total emissions are given by the sum of emissions of cost leaders, unregu-
lated quality leaders, and regulated quality leaders. Hence, aggregate pollution












R&D aims at developing blueprints for improving the quality of a certain prod-
uct or blueprints for adopting the latest technology in a certain sector. The
development of a blueprint requires a units of labour, so that the cost of a
blueprint is aw. There are six types of blueprints corresponding to the six ¯rm
types. For example, there are blueprints for higher quality using the traditional
technology (denoted by T) or blueprints for adopting the labour-saving GPT 2,
denoted by L. We denote these blueprints as type k 2 fT;L;U;R;F;Eg. The







where Lgk is the amount of labour engaged in developing blueprints of type k.
The value of a blueprint equals the stock market value of a ¯rm that exploits
the blueprint. Free entry in research guarantees that, whenever research activity
is targeted at developing blueprints of type k, the value of a ¯rm of type k, i.e.
vk, equals the cost of the blueprint:
vk · aw with equality whenever Lgk > 0: (13)
The value of a ¯rm is determined by the no arbitrage equation which states
that the expected rate of return on stock must equal the return in an equal size
investment in a riskless bond:
¼k + _ vk ¡ sk = rvk (14)
where sk is the expected value of the capital loss that occurs because of shocks
{ technological innovation { to the sector. This capital loss crucially depends
on what type of innovation is going on in the economy: whether it is quality
improvement or adoption and which sectors innovation is aimed at. To solve
the model, we only need to know the risk term for the type of ¯rm for which
new blueprints are developed. In the present model setup, only one type of
blueprints is developed at a certain point in time. Whenever quality improve-
ments are developed, quality leaders face the risk of being replaced by a new
quality leader. They lose total value of the ¯rm with a probability equal to
the number of blueprints being developed; hence, sk = ¶vk. However, when
researchers develop blueprints to adopt the newest technology, cost leaders {
¯rms that already have adopted the new technology { face no risk until all ¯rms
have adopted the new GPT, such that sk = 0.
Labour market
Labour is supplied inelastically and equals L. Labour demand consists of em-
ployment in manufacturing and total employment in R&D. Clearing of the
7Since the number of sectors is normalised to one, the number of blueprints developed
equals the fraction of sectors in which innovation occurs.
8labour market requires:




4 Innovation and Pollution in Four Stages
We now discuss the di®erent stages of growth that the economy goes through.
Each stage can be characterised by a state variable, which is the number of
¯rms of one particular type. This number is inherited from the previous stage
and endogenously changes over time in each stage.
4.1 Innovation and pollution in the \green phase"
In the ¯rst phase, the green phase, all active enterprises are traditional ¯rms,
i.e. quality leaders using GPT 1. Innovation is exclusively aimed at improving
product qualities. This reduces the model to the Grossman/Helpman model
(1991, chapter 4). Since the clean GPT is used, there is no pollution at all.
The rate of innovation is given below in equation (28).
4.2 Innovation and pollution in the \con¯dence phase"
General equilibrium dynamics
In the adoption subphase GPT 2 is available for adoption, but has not yet
been implemented in all sectors. Since adoption is costly, i.e. a sector-speci¯c
blueprint must be developed, it takes place only if the returns to this research
investment are large enough. If research were targeted not only at adoption but
also at quality improvement in traditional sectors, we would require ¼L = ¼T
for this to be an equilibrium, which only happens by coincidence. If ¼L <
¼T, no adoption would take place (LgL = 0), the con¯dence phase would not
start and the economy would remain in the green phase. Therefore, we focus
on the more interesting case in which ¼L > ¼T so that adoption takes place
without simultaneous quality improvements in traditional sectors. Accordingly,
we assume:
´ < 1=¸:
Hence, once the new GPT becomes available, in the beginning all labour in
R&D develops blueprints for adoption so that Lgk = 0 for all k 6= L, a¶ = LgL,
and LgL + Lx = L. The relevant state variable in this phase is the number of
labour-cost leaders nL, which starts at zero. It increases with the number of
patents developed:
_ nL = ¶ =
1
a
(L ¡ Lx) (16)
As noted above, with adoption only, cost leaders face no risk of being replaced,
i.e. sL = 0. Using equations (8), (13) and (14), we ¯nd the following no-












Substituting (4) into (17) to eliminate r, substituting (10) into (16) to eliminate
Lx and taking into account cj=cj¡1 = ´, nT + nL = 1 and nU = nR = nF =
nE = 0, we ¯nd:
_ y
y



















where ¹ = (1=¸) ¡ ´ > 0 and y = Y=w. Note that y is not per capita income
but spending per wage income. This system of di®erential equations in nL and
y characterises the dynamics of the ¯rst period of the con¯dence phase. The
resulting phase diagram is depicted in Figure 2 by the ¶ = _ nL = 0 locus, the
lower dy = 0 locus and the curved path to the North East. The area above
the ¶ = 0 locus is infeasible since it represents negative employment in R&D.
For any point below this locus, innovation takes place, causing the number of
quality leaders nL to increase. The area to the right of the line nL = 1 is
also infeasible since nL represents a fraction of sectors, which cannot exceed
unity. Adoption comes necessarily to an end if all sectors have adopted the
new GPT. It is clear from (18) and (19) that this will happen in ¯nite time.
In the diagram, it happens when the nL = 1 line or the ¶ = 0 locus is hit.
What exactly happens depends on the value y initially takes at the time that
GPT 2 becomes available. At this time, the con¯dence phase starts at nL = 0.
Variable y has to jump initially such that the boundary conditions are satis¯ed.
Since consumption is proportional to Lx and Lx is proportional to y [see (10)],
consumption smoothing by households rules out a jump in y in the absence of
unexpected shocks. Hence, the end condition for y in the adoption subphase is
given by the initial value for y in the subsequent improvement subphase, which
is determined below.
In the second period of the con¯dence phase, the improvement subphase,
all sectors have switched to the new GPT. As there is no further possibility
to invent blueprints for adoption and because research is still economically
attractive, inventions are now directed at improving product qualities so that





(L ¡ Lx) (20)
The rate of innovation now re°ects the fraction of sectors in which a new qual-
ity leader replaces an incumbent. Since an innovator is indi®erent between
replacing a quality leader (¯rm of type U) or a cost leader (L-¯rm) { in both


















Figure 2: Dynamics con¯dence phase in the nL, y plane
sectors. As a result, a fraction nL of the total number blueprints developed (¶)
hits L-¯rms, which are then replaced by quality leaders. Hence we have:
_ nL = ¡nL¶ (21)
At the same time, ¶ is the probability for an individual quality leader that he
will be replaced and will experience a complete capital loss. Hence, we have












¡ ¶ = r (22)
Substituting (4) into (22) to eliminate r, substituting (10) into (20) to eliminate
Lx and taking into account nL + nU = 1, nT = nR = nF = nE = 0, we ¯nd:
_ y
y



























This dynamic system in the nL;y plane characterises the second period of the
con¯dence phase. It is saddlepoint stable. Hence, starting at nL = 1, y jumps
to the saddlepath and asymptotically converges to nL = 0 and y = L + a½.
The path to the South West in Figure 2 depicts the dynamic adjustment. As
a result of the determination of the starting- and endpoint of the improvement
subphase, also the starting-point of the adoption subphase can be identi¯ed.
11Pollution and innovation
During the con¯dence phase, untaxed emissions rise. This rise in pollution can
be decomposed in a scale e®ect, technique e®ect and composition e®ect. In the
adoption subphase, pollution can be derived from (11) as:
Z = nLy (25)
Since both nL and y gradually increase during the adoption subphase, we see
immediately from (25) that the same holds for pollution. We argue that this
happens because changes in scale, composition and technique all tend to in-
crease pollution. First, the technique e®ect is positive, i.e. pollution enhanc-
ing, since GPT 2 is polluting. Second, when a sector adopts the new GPT,
it not only starts to pollute but also reduces prices and produces more. The
gradual adoption of the new GPT (nL rises) changes the composition of total
output. This corresponds to intrasectoral changes from clean to dirty ¯rms. Fi-
nally, total production a®ects pollution. De¯ning total production as the sum
of sectoral production levels, we ¯nd the following expression for the con¯dence

















Because nL and y gradually increase during the adoption subphase, we see
immediately from (26) that total production gradually rises, so that the scale
e®ect also contributes to rising pollution levels.
To describe the development of the innovation rate, we need to determine
how Lx changes over time [see (16)]. Appendix A shows that Lx increases (de-
creases) and innovation falls (rises) over time if ´ is large (small). The intuition
is as follows. On the one hand, the rate of innovation tends to fall over time.
This re°ects the fact that the more sectors have switched, the fewer opportuni-
ties are left for further adoption and the sooner innovation has to be redirected
to quality improvements, which yields a lower rate of return. Forward-looking
behaviour of investors ensures that the rate of return is smoothed and research
e®orts are gradually reduced. With lower research e®orts, labour becomes avail-
able to expand the scale of production. On the other hand, if production with
the new GPT saves a lot of labour, i.e. if ´ is small, the opposite happens and
labour becomes available for research. With a small ´, the process of adoption
is relatively fast and the scale of production as measured by Lx declines. Nev-
ertheless, pollution increases over time since fast adoption allows the technique
and composition e®ect to dominate the (pollution-saving) scale e®ect. The rise
in pollution and the decreasing innovation rate (for a su±cient high ´) dur-
ing the con¯dence adoption subphase is illustrated in Figure 3 by the curve
segments from nL = 0 to nL = 1.
In the improvement subphase, pollution increases as well over time, although
at a decreasing pace. Since all sectors are using GPT 2 with a ¯xed emission
output ratio, changes in pollution can be explained entirely by changes in total
output (X) or labour in production (Lx). There are no intrasectoral changes
121
nT ￿ 1
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Figure 3: Pollution and innovation in all phases
or technological e®ects. From (10) and (11) we ¯nd:




Appendix A shows that Lx rises over time. This implies a gradual increase in
pollution and a gradual fall in innovation. The underlying cause is a fall in
the rate of return to innovation. As the proportion of low-price ¯rms increases,
more labour is allocated to incumbents and less is available per quality leader
that replaces a cost-leader. As a result, pro¯ts for entrants fall and innovation
becomes less pro¯table. The paths of pollution and of the innovation rate are
again depicted in Figure 3 (curve segments from nU = 0 to nU = 1).
The innovation intensity at the end of the con¯dence phase (when nL ap-
proaches zero) can be solved by ¯rst substituting (21) and (23) into (24) to









½ ´ ¶GH (28)
When only quality improvement is possible and the mass of cost leaders ap-
proaches zero, the model structure is the same as in Grossman and Helpman
(1991, chapter 4). Hence, the innovation rate in (28) equals the innovation rate
of their model (denoted by ¶GH).
4.3 Innovation and pollution in the \alarm phase"
The economy enters the alarm phase once it starts taxing pollution. Society is
aware of or alarmed about the polluting e®ects of using GPT 2. To mitigate
the adverse e®ects, ¯rms are charged a pollution tax. Provided that all sectors
13are at least hit once during the second period of the con¯dence phase, all active
¯rms at the beginning of the alarm phase are regulated quality leaders (R-
¯rms). To simplify matters, we assume that the alarm phase starts not until
labour-cost leaders have disappeared, i.e. nL = 0.
In addition, we rule out the case that it is pro¯table for ¯rms to switch back
to the old traditional technology. This requires that the pro¯ts from readopting
GPT 1 fall short of those from further quality improvements still using GPT
2. From (8), we see that this requires 1 ¡ aL1w=(aL2w + ¿) < 1 ¡ 1=¸, or after
substitution of (9):8
¿=w < ¸ ¡ ´
Firms still make pro¯ts and research is still pro¯table. Innovators develop new
quality generations of the regulated products. Successful innovators become
new quality leaders and set prices pR = ¸(´w+¿). No other types of innovation
are undertaken, so that Lgk = 0 for k 6= R and LgR + Lx = L. The value of a
blueprint is determined by vR, and we have aw = vR if LgR > 0.
The dynamics of the alarm phase can be determined in analogy to the
dynamics of the improvement subphase of the con¯dence phase. Substituting
(4) into (22) to eliminate r, substituting (10) into (20) to eliminate Lx, and




















If ¯rms expect no shocks, i.e. they do not anticipate the arrival of a new
GPT or a change in taxation, equation (29) can only hold forever if y remains
constant over time.9 Hence, we can set (29) equal to zero to obtain the following





where µZ2 = (¿=w)=(´ + ¿=w) is the share of pollution in total cost for GPT
2. In addition, from equations (10), (20) and (30) the steady state innovation































8If ¿=w > ¸ ¡ ´, the alarm phase as described in the text does not arise and the economy
enters immediately a \reswitching phase" once the tax is imposed. This phase is very similar
to the cleaning-up phase analysed in the text (see section 4.4). The only modi¯cation needed
is setting ° equal to one. When GPT 3 arrives, a adoption phase starts in which GPT 1 is
replaced by GPT 3. The analysis of this phase is more complex than the one in the text since
with \reswitching" there are potentially three GPTs in the market.
9Otherwise y would grow or shrink at an increasing rate, both of which is not feasible.
14Note that spending per wage income and the rate of innovation increase in the
pollution tax; for ¿ > 0 we have ¶SSAlarm > ¶GH and (L + a½)=(1 ¡ (µZ2=¸)) >
L+a½. The intuition behind this remarkable result for growth is that a pollution
tax increases the cost of production relative to that of R&D, which is a non-
polluting activity. Thus, the policy intervention causes a reallocation of labour
from manufacturing to the development of blueprints. As a result, in the alarm
phase, the rate of innovation jumps up and total emissions jump down compared
to the values at the end of the con¯dence phase as shown in Figure 3 (curve
segments at nR = 1). But both variables remain constant during the alarm
phase.
4.4 Innovation and pollution in the \cleaning-up phase"
General equilibrium dynamics
From the point of view of GPTs, the cleaning-up phase is similar to the con-
¯dence phase. A new unregulated technology is available for adoption, but its
di®usion takes time, since adoption is costly. Adoption takes place only if the
returns to the development of a blueprint for adopting GPT 3 are large enough.





which implies ¼R < ¼F (see Table 1). Regulated quality leaders stay active as
long as no rival in their sector has incurred the cost to adopt GPT 3. Innovators
that produce with the new GPT are ¯rst movers (F-Firms).
We can use expressions derived for the con¯dence phase to describe the
dynamics of the cleaning-up phase. For the adoption subphase, we need to
replace nL by nF in (16). Substituting (4) into (17) to eliminate r, substituting
(10) into (16) to eliminate Lx, and taking into account cj=cj¡1 = °=(´ +¿=w),


































where µL2 = 1 ¡ µZ2 = ´=(´ + ¿=w) is the labour cost share for GPT 2.
For the improvements subphase, we need to replace nL by nF in (21). Sub-
stituting (4) into (22) to eliminate r, substituting (10) into (20) to eliminate
Lx, and taking into account nF + nE= 1, nT = nL = nU = nR = 0, we get:
_ y
y



























where ¹F = (1=¸) ¡ °=(´ + ¿=w).
15The two dynamic systems in (34)-(37) can be depicted in a nF;y plane
similar to Figure 2. The equilibrium dynamics can again be characterised by
a rise in nF from 0 to 1, while y increases. After a ¯nite time there is an
endogenous switch to the improvement subphase in which both nF and y fall
over time.
Pollution and innovation
Pollution is obviously absent in the improvement subphase. Moreover, innova-
tion falls similar to innovation in the improvement subphase of the con¯dence
regime. Hence, we focus on what happens to pollution and innovation in the







It turns out that pollution continuously falls over time (see Appendix B). More
and more sectors switch to the clean technology (nF increases), which reduces
pollution. The upward pressure on pollution from increases in spending y is
dominated by intrasectoral shifts from dirty to clean ¯rms. The clean F-¯rms
are for the most part responsible for rising y, since they charge a lower price
and produce more than regulated quality leaders. In this case, the composition
and technique e®ect outweigh the pollution-using scale e®ect.
Labour allocated to production can be written from (10) as:
Lx = y
µ




Since y and nF increase over time, the amount of labour in production also
gradually increases if ¸° ¸ ´. Since the rate of innovation is negatively related
to Lx, as in (16), innovation falls over time. This seems to be the most realistic
case. It seems natural to assume that the superiority of GPT 3 over GPT 2 in
terms of pollution (aZ3 = 0 < aZ2 = 1) comes at the cost of a higher labour
requirement, that is aL3 = ° > aL2 = ´. Since ¸ > 1 we have ¸° > ´.10
The progression of both pollution and the innovation rate during the cleaning-
up phase is shown in Figure 3 (curve segments form nF = 0 to nF = 1 for the
adoption subphase and from nE = 0 to nE = 1 for the improvement subphase).
At the beginning of the adoption subphase pollution jumps down and the in-
novations rate jumps up compared to the values during the alarm phase. The
reason for these jumps is a reallocation of labour from manufacturing to R&D.
Developing blueprints for adopting GPT 3 yields a higher rate of return than
developing blueprints for quality improvements.
10In case ¸° < ´ innovation may ¯rst rise and then fall over time. In this case (39) is
isomorphic to (A.8) so that the analyses of appendix A can be repeated and the pattern of
innovation found there emerges.
165 Empirical Validation
In the model analysed above, the rise in pollution is primarily caused by the
availability of a new GPT, which entails lower labour costs but causes higher
pollution, and an increase in aggregate production. Likewise, the downturn in
pollution is based on two main mechanisms: ¯rst, the imposition of a pollution
tax due to the awakening of the public's attention to environmental degradation
and, second, the intrasectoral adjustments towards cleaner production technolo-
gies. These results ¯t fairly well with real-world observations. As an example,
consider the nitrogen oxide emissions in the last decades for the USA, UK, Ger-
many and Switzerland, as shown in Figure 4. It was not until the eighties of
the last century that the NOx emissions stopped increasing, and then started
to decline signi¯cantly. Similar emission patterns can also be observed for other
air pollutants, e.g. sulphur dioxide.

































Note: NOx emissions in Gg.
Source: USA: EPA (2000 and 2005); UK: DEFRA (2005),
Germany: DESTATIS (1966 - 2004), Switzerland: SAEFL (1995 and 2005).
Figure 4: NOx for the USA, UK, Germany and Switzerland
The rise in nitrogen oxide emissions was mainly caused by scale e®ects. For
example, increasing mobility and globalisation led to drastic growth in road
tra±c in all four countries. Environmental degradation attracted broad public
attention in the late nineteen seventies. In 1979, the countries considered signed
the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP) of the
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. In 1988 the convention
was extended by a protocol concerning the control of nitrogen oxides or their
transboundary °uxes.11 The vertical lines labelled \LRTAP" in Figure 4 depict
11Up until 1999, the convention was extended by eight protocols aiming at the reduction of
speci¯c pollutants.
17the signing of the LRTAP convention.
In the subsequent years the governments enacted a number of laws to achieve
the agreed emission reductions. The regulations were mainly geared to the ma-
jor sources of nitrogen oxide: road transport and combustion plants. In the
USA and particularly in California, catalytic converters became mandatory in
the late nineteen seventies; Switzerland followed in 1987 and the European
Union in 1993. This regulation has led to a gradual displacement of old motor
vehicles by less exhaust-intensive vehicles with catalytic converters. In ad-
dition, the exhaust gas regulations were and are still tightened continuously.
Moreover, Germany and Switzerland recently established a performance-based
heavy vehicles fee, inter alia in order to con¯ne heavy vehicle tra±c. Concern-
ing combustion plants, tightened emission restrictions led to the installation
of so-called low nitrogen oxides burners, which can reduce emissions by up to
30%. Summarising, the NOx emission reductions can be traced back to the
interaction of governmental regulation, intrasectoral substitution processes and
the adoption of new, cleaner technologies.
6 Conclusions
To analyse the relationship between economic growth, environmental degra-
dation and technology changes, we have set up a Schumpeterian endogenous
growth model with pollution. The model contributes to the literature by, ¯rst,
treating the direction of technological change as endogenous, i.e. innovation op-
portunities and incentives determine whether technological change is pollution-
using or pollution saving. Second, the model stresses the importance of intra-
sectoral { rather than intersectoral { shifts as a leading cause for the resulting
pollution-income relation.
At ¯rst, a technological breakthrough in the form of a new general purpose
technology gives rise to the gradual adoption of this new technology by pro¯t
maximising ¯rms. As a side-e®ect, pollution rises. Once pollution taxes are
imposed to address the pollution externality, the pattern of technological change
and innovation is a®ected. Due to the emission taxation it becomes pro¯table
for ¯rms to adopt a new, clean GPT. This results in a gradual decrease of
pollution associated with the use of the previous GPT.
We have shown that the gradual adoption of new general purpose technolo-
gies, which leads to intrasectoral shifts from clean to dirty ¯rms or vice versa,
predicts a pattern of pollution over time that is consistent with the EKC hypoth-
esis. New technologies sometimes increase pollution, and decrease pollution at
other times, depending on the characteristics of the general purpose technology
that opens up opportunities for innovation and on the environmental policies
that are in place. Our investigation of the relationship between innovation and
pollution shows that we cannot expect an unambiguous correlation between
changes in pollution and innovation, since both variables are endogenous and
determined by several forces that act simultaneously. When pollution is not
taxed (during the con¯dence phase), pollution rises while innovation falls over
time; but during adoption of the clean technology (cleaning-up phase), both
18pollution and innovation decline over time. Hence, the relationship between
environmental policy and economic growth varies with the di®erent stages of
growth.
The model set up above does not necessarily predict an EKC for all pollu-
tants. In empirical research, the EKC is found only for speci¯c pollutants, i.e.
for pollutants with local and immediate e®ects. In our model, the downward
sloping part of the EKC emerges only if the polluting GPT is eventually re-
placed by a cleaner GPT. The adoption of the cleaner GPT requires su±cient
incentives, i.e. a high pollution tax or low enough labour costs associated with
the clean GPT. Otherwise, no technology shift takes place and the pollution
tax only has the conventional static (level) e®ect. In this case, the economy
would remain in the alarm phase.
Our model provides a natural framework for the examination of the idea of
overlapping EKCs. Booth (1998) has argued quite strongly that one pollutant
can only be phased out because it is replaced by another pollutant. Put more
moderately, it could be that seemingly clean GPTs turn out to be polluting in
the end. If this is the case, additional GPTs have to be developed in a row
until ¯nally, hopefully, one GPT really turns out to be clean. In the model,
the substitution of a pollutant for another would result in an overlapping of the
cleaning-up phase with a second con¯dence phase.
An obvious extension of the model would be the possible ability of individ-
uals to expect the arrival of new GPTs. For example, we could assume that
the occurrence of new GPTs follows a Poisson process. It is conceivable that,
for certain pollutants, technical solutions in the future can be anticipated to
a certain degree. In other cases, however, it seems reasonable to assume that
the arrival of a technological breakthrough is highly uncertain and arrives, if
ever, unexpectedly. In addition, the sequencing of the di®erent phases can be
more complex than modelled in this approach. Arrival dates of pro¯table GPTs
and/or the introduction of taxes can be assumed to occur at di®erent points
in time so that more types of producers are active in the markets when a new
phase begins. Finally, one could elaborate more on optimal taxation. This
requires the analysis of instruments to correct pollution, to correct R&D, and
to correct output levels in order to remove the distortionary pricing e®ects. All
these issues are left for future research.
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22Appendix
A Pollution and Innovation in the Con¯dence Phase
To ¯nd out the development of aggregate pollution and the rate of innovation
in the con¯dence phase, we transform the phase diagram from Figure 2 and
equations (18), (19), (23) and (24) into a phase diagram in the Lx, nL plane.
Adoption subphase
Lx may either fall or rise during the adoption subphase, depending on whether
´ is small or large respectively. From (10) we ¯nd the following expression for
Lx in the con¯dence adoption subphase:
Lx = y
µ




We use (A.1) to replace y in (18) and (19) by Lx and ¯nd the following dynamic





a[1 ¡ (1 ¡ ¸´)nL]
(A.2)




(L ¡ Lx) (A.3)
The _ Lx = 0 locus is downward sloping as long as 1=¸ > ´ which is the case due
to our assumption that ¹ ´ 1=¸ ¡ ´ > 0 (to ensure that ¼L > ¼T). The initial
jump in Lx is determined in the same way as that of y, see main text: the
endvalue of Lx is determined by its initial value in the subsequent improvement
subphase. However, we can also use the endvalue of y to determine the end value
of Lx by using the relation between these two variables given by (A.1). Hence,
we can infer some useful properties of the endvalue of Lx from the endvalue of




(L + a½) (A.4)




(L + a½) (A.5)
From (A.2) we see that when nL = 1,we have
_ Lx · 0 if Lx ·
¹L + ´a½
¹ + 1 ¡ ´
(A.6)
Now consider the following condition:
´
1 ¡ ¹
(L + a½) ·
¹L + ´a½
¹ + 1 ¡ ´
(A.7)
23If condition (A.7) holds, Lx has to reach a value at the end of the adoption
phase that turns out to be so small [namely smaller than the expression at the
LHS of (A.7), see (A.5)] that it can only be reached by a declining Lx [as is
revealed by (A.6)]. Note that for su±ciently low values of ´ this condition is
satis¯ed. Figure 5 c) depicts this situation.
Let us now consider the opposite case in which ´ takes its maximal value,
that is ´ = 1=¸ so that ¹ = 0. The dy = 0 locus and the dLx = 0 locus are
horizontal. Moreover, y and Lx have to reach the values L+a½ and (L+a½)=¸
respectively at the end of the adoption subphase. Under our assumption that
¶GH > 0, see (28), this endpoint lies above the dLx = 0 locus, see (A.2), and
Lx has to increase over the entire adoption subphase. Figure 5 a) depicts this
situation.
For intermediate values of ´ we get the dynamics as depicted in Figure 5
b). The larger ´, the more likely a rising pattern for Lx becomes. Note that Lx
may ¯rst fall and then rise (but never the other way around) in the adoption
subphase.
Improvement subphase
We show that Lx unambiguously falls during the improvement subphase. For








We use (A.8) to replace y in (23) and (24) by Lx and ¯nd the following dynamic













(L ¡ Lx) (A.10)
The _ Lx = 0 locus is downward sloping. Since the improvement subphase starts
at nL = 1 and has to converge to a constant value for Lx and nL = 0, Lx has
to start at a value above the dLx = 0 locus and will increase over time. Figure
5 combines the two subphases.
The development of pollution in the improvement subphase directly follows
from (27) and the notion that Lx rises over time. The development of the rate



































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 5: Dynamics con¯dence phase in the nL, Lx plane
25B Pollution in the Cleaning-up phase
We transform the dynamic system in (34)-(35) into a dynamic system in terms
of Z and nR. Substituting (38) in these equations to eliminate y, and replacing










L ¡ [¸°=nR ¡ (¸° ¡ ´)]Z
anR
(B.2)
where » = ´+(¸¡1)(¿=w+´)+[¿=w+´¡¸°]¡¸°. Note that » > ¡¸° from
our assumptions made above to ensure adoption of the clean GPT [the term in
square brackets is positive, see (33)].
We now have two situations, depending on whether » is positive or nega-
tive. First, if it is positive, the dZ = 0 locus slopes positive in the feasible
region (for 0 < nR < 1) and the saddlepath slopes downward so that pollution
unambiguously falls with the fall in nR. Figure 6 shows the phase diagram for
this case. Second, if » is negative, the dZ = 0 locus has a vertical asymptote at
nR = ¡¸°=» > 1 and slopes downward in the feasible range (for 0 < nR < 1).
However, the saddlepath slopes downward so that again pollution unambigu-
ously falls with the fall in nR. The corresponding phase diagram would resemble













Figure 6: Dynamics cleaning-up phase in the nR, Z plane
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